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NOTE
APPLYING THE CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT
TO PENAL REFORM
The penal treatment of convicted criminals may be designed
to serve various goals: deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and
preventive detention. Legislatures, however, do not generally ar-
ticulate which of these goals are to be served.' Yet the vast dis-
cretion bestowed by the legislatures upon judges and administra-
tive agencies indicates an underlying goal of individual treatment
directed towards rehabilitation.2 This unspoken policy rests on
the fundamental assumption that those vested with discretion
know how to reform the offender. In fact, this assumption is un-
warranted; the process of sentencing and correction takes place
in a virtual informational vacuum. As one commentator notes,
the treatment of criminal offenders today may have no more sup-
port "than the incantations of medicine men and potions of
witches."3 Therefore, without some form of research, the imple-
mentation of programs to further any of the possible goals of a
penal system remains largely a matter of happenstance.'
Because our society values both liberty and rehabilitation,
it is important to develop a mix of correctional tools that will ad-
vance these two policies. When and for how long should a person
'See Frankel. Ladesness in Sentencing. 41 U. Ci.-. L RE v. 1 (1972).
2 judge Frankel states:
The basic premise of the indeterminate sentence is the modern conception
that rehabilitation is the paramount goal in sentencing. The idea is to avoid the
Procrustean mold of uniform sentences to fit crimes in the abstract and to focus
upon the progress over time of the unique individual in order to determine when
it may be safe for society and good for him to set him free. at least within the
limits of parole supervision.
Id. at 29. In Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of broad judicial discretion in sentencing and individualization of punishment.
, L WILKINS. EVALUATION OF PENAL MEASuREs 9 (1969).
"See Cramton. Driver Behavior and Legal Santions. A Study of Deterrence, 67 MtCi. L
REv. 421 (1969). Dean Cramton writes:
The special task of the behavioral scientist is to analyze alternative legal arrange-
ments from various points of view and to provide as accurate a statement as pos-
sible concerning the actual or expected benefits and costs of existing and proposed
arrangements. With this information (or its best practicable approximation)
policymakers may make an informed and rational choice of various modes and
levels of social control.
Id. at 422.
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be sent to prison? What treatment should he receive while in pris-
on? And when should he be diverted from the criminal justice
system entirely? These are questions that deserve attention. More-
over, due to limited prison resources it is especially important to
efficiently and accurately assess new efforts at reform. This Note
will examine one research tool, the controlled social experiment,
in two contexts: post-conviction treatment of offenders and, to a
lesser extent, pretrial diversion. In addition, this Note will explore
whether such experiments are permissible in light of present social
values and the limitations placed on state action by the Constitu-
tion.
I
THE CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT
The controlled experiment in penal reform is a legislatively
sanctioned test of theories, programs, and methods of treatment
aimed at furthering legitimate correctional goals. A class of simi-
larly situated offenders is randomly divided into two groups. One
group is exposed to the new treatment (experimentals), while the
other is treated as if no experiment were taking place (controls).
The two groups are then studied and compared to determine
what effect, if any, the new treatment has had and whether that
effect has proven beneficial in terms of the goal set (e.g., rehabil-
itation, deterrence, preventive detention).
For example, in order to test the success of a pretrial diver-
sion program, half of those eligible would be treated in the pro-
gram, while the other half would be processed through the criminal
justice system. A program designed to test the value of certain
modes of incarceration might send one group of randomly se-
lected offenders to an experimental prison, while distributing- a
control group throughout the regular prison system. On a more
extreme level, a program might be designed to test the very as-
sumptions upon which certain offenders are incarcerated. Using
probation or parole, such a program would release a randomly
selected group of offenders into the community, while a similar
group would be left to complete their sentences. Follow-up studies
would then be carried out to determine what goals were served by
choosing one form of treatment over another.
Although this Note focuses on the use of controlled experi-
ments for rehabilitative purposes, this research technique is adapt-
able to any of the substantive goals of a penal system, with the
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possible exception of retribution. Judgments regarding punish-
ment for punishment's sake tend to be made on a purely emotion-
al level. But where the technique is used to shape public behavior
and not merely to wreak retributive justice upon the individual
offender, it is fully applicable. For example, it has been suggested
that controlled experiments be conducted to discover methods of
deterring as well as treating drunken drivers.5
The design of the controlled experiment will to some extent
be dictated by the program being tested and the nature of the
institution involved. For example, where a new policy's effect on
the public is being tested, regions rather than individuals will com-
prise the control and experimental groups.6 If the policy is to have
an effect only upon a certain class of individuals, that class will
comprise the universe from which the control and experimental
groups are selected. Nevertheless, two characteristics are neces-
sary for a scientifically valid experiment. The groups must be vir-
tually identical with respect to the fact being tested, and they must
be randomly selected-assignment to either group must rest on
nothing more than mere chance. 7
There are, of course, other less desirable research methods
available to social scientists.8 "Before and after" studies are one
common alternative. This technique investigates changes brought
about by a new program by comparing the situation prior to the
program's introduction with the situation afterwards. Unfortu-
nately, such comparisons are extremely inefficient and inaccurate
because evaluation takes place only after the program has been
fully implemented. "Matching exercises" are another alternative.
Here the researcher attempts to locate individuals who are virtu-
ally identical to those in the experimental program and then com-
pares the two groups. The results, however, are generally unre-
liable, due to the difficulty of achieving an accurate "match-up."9
S Id. at 452.
See. e.g.. Aguayo v. Richardson. 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973). cmt. denied, 414 U.S.
1146 (1974) (experimental group consisted of approximately 25 percent of all welfare re-
cipients in New York State).
?Ser D. GLAsE, ROUTINIZING EVALUATiON: GErtrNG FEEDBACK ON EFFECTIhSESS OF
CRME A.D D.wLQUECc:Y PaoGst .s 55-83 (1973).
* For a general discussion of research methods, see id. at 66-82.
'Ste Zimring. Measuring the Impact of Pretrial Ditwsion from the Criminal Justice Sys-
ten. 41 U. Cm. L Rzv. 224.226 (1974):
The matching strategy thus attempts to duplicate the similarity of groups created
by random assignment by finding similar persons in similar positions... [M]atch-
ing exercises can be constructed from historical records after a treatment group
[Vol 62:158
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Thus, there is a consensus among social scientists that con-
trolled experimentation is by far the most accurate and efficient
research tool available,10 and one quite necessary in the develop-
ment of a rational system of sentencing: "The step from our pres-
ent too broad analysis of competing treatment methods toward the
gradual development of a treatment nosology demands much
more refined and narrow controlled experimentation, and is an
inevitable precursor of rational penal reform."" But even if such
experiments are deemed the most efficient means of achieving
penal reform, human experimentation raises serious ethical and
legal problems.12 In view of the limits placed upon government
by the Constitution, these problems are particularly acute where
such experimentation is conducted within the criminal justice
system.' 3
II
THE DILEMMA OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION
IN THE CORRECTIONS Co-rExxT
Any technique of human experimentation rests on the con-
cept of using the individual for the benefit of society as a whole.
In essence, society may permissibly harm the individual in its ef-
fort to gain knowledge. However, the concept of the "human
guinea pig" is not well-received in our society. In the bio-medical
field, the problem is lessened by requiring informed consent.' 4 In
has been selected and processed.... Such after-the-fact matching is quicker.
cheaper, and vastly more dangerous than controlled experimentation.
"See H. ZsEtl, H. KALVF.N & B. BucninoLz. DELAY I. THE Courts 241 (1959):
The popular notion of an "experiment." in the sense of an innovation, tenta-
tively introduced on a limited scale, is already quite familiar to the field ofjudicial
administration The trouble is that these tryouts are as a rule not accompanied
by control procedures that permit us to learn exactly what was and what was not
achieved. Only a scientifically controlled experiment can do this.
(Emphasis added.) See also Garabedian, Research and Practice in Planning Correctional
Change. 17 CRIME & DEuQur.vcyC 41, 46 (1971); Geis, Ethical and Legal Issues in Eperi-
mentation uith Offender Populations, in Jot'Tr CoMmissim. o. CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER
AND TRAINLNG, RESEARCH IN CORRECTIONAL REHABILITATION 34 (1967); Morris, Impedi-
ments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CI. L Rxv. 627. 646 (1966); Zimring, supra note 9, at 225.
II Morris, supra note 10. at 645 n.28.
'2 For an excellent discussion of the ethical dilemmas involved in bio-medical human
experimentation, see Freund et al., Ethical Aspects of Experiventation uith Human Sabjects, S.8
DAEDALUS 219-594 (1969).
13 See notes 37-77 and accompanying text infra.
14 A great deal of controversy surrounds the question whether fully informed vol-
untary consent can be achieved. See Jaffe. Law as a SYstem of Control. 98 DAEDALUS 406
(1969): Lasagna. Special Subjects in Human Experimentation. 98 DA.DALUS 449 (1969).
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the correctional context, on the other hand, consent may not be a
useful, or indeed relevant consideration. For example, if one is
testing the efficacy of different parole or sentencing decisions (a
form of governmental action traditionally imposed upon unwill-
ing individuals), the addition of consent to the research design
must necessarily reduce the accuracy of results. As a practical con-
sideration, consent may create self-consciousness among the par-
ticipants and stimulate expectations that bias the experiment.1 5
Indeed, mere disclosure to a prisoner of his participation in an
experiment may increase the cynicism already felt by most con-
victs and foster a negative "guinea pig" mentality.16
In view of the inapplicability of consent to correctional ex-
perimentation, it is fair to say that such "social experimentation
epitomizes the central dilemma posed by all experimentation in-
volving human beings: when, in a society that values both knowl-
edge and human dignity and equality, may some people be used
as means to serve the ends of the group?"1 7 Such a sacrifice of the
individual is superficially antithetical to our criminal justice sys-
tem which itself sacrifices much in the way of efficiency and truth
in order to restrict the power of the group and protect the indi-
vidual. Thus, the question of experimentation in treating of-
fenders requires a profound value judgment: "Is it justifiable to
impose a criminal sanction guided by the necessities of research
and not the felt necessities of the case?"' 8
Aside from these ethical constraints, the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution and to a lesser extent
the eighth amendment stand as obvious stumbling blocks to con-
trolled correctional experiments. By its very nature a valid experi-
ment must discriminate between similarly situated people and do
so on the basis of pure chance.' 9
Despite these ethical problems and constitutional objections,
a model of controlled experimentation, sanctioned by the legisla-
"S ee Geis. supra note 10. at 37; Zeisel. Reducing the Hazards of Human Experiments
Through Modifications in Research Design. 169 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 475. 475 (1970).
"See Geis.supra nole 10. at 37.
"7 Capron. Social Experimentation and the Lau., in ETHICAL A.D LEGAL ISSUES OF
SOCIAL ExPERsILtTATIO. 127 (A. Rivlin & P. Timpane eds. 1975).
" Morris.supra note 10. at 647.
"See H. ZEISEL FT AL., supra note 10. at 242. Dean Cramton also points out this fun-
damental dilemma: "Experiments on human subjects involving legal requirements threaten
a fundamental principle of the legal order: that equals will be treated equally. If controlled
experiments were conducted, a deliberate inequality would be imposed by the legal system
contrary to this fundamental principle." Cramton. supra note 4. at 451.
[Vol. 62:158
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ture, can be designed and implemented. The model suggested
here consists of three basic guidelines: (1) that the experiment
be imposed only after the offender has passed through judicial
proceedings and into the correctional system (hereinafter referred
to as administrative experimentation); (2) that the experimental
treatment be less severe than the treatment traditionally given 20
(hereinafter referred to as lessened severity); and (3) that the over-
all differences in treatment between the control and experimental
groups not be excessive 21 (hereinafter referred to as nonexcessive
differences in treatment). The first two guidelines were suggested
by Dean Norval Morris. 22 Such a design minimizes the ethical
problems inherent in such experimentation and would probably
withstand constitutional attack.
The first and third guidelines are straightforward in appli-
cation. Administrative experimentation requires that the judge
treat each offender normally and that any experiment be con-
ducted through administrative agencies, which are better equipped
in terms of resources and expertise to undertake serious re-
search.23 This guideline appears best suited to a penal system with
flexible administrative sentencing procedures. However, even in
those systems with judge-imposed sentencing, the flexibility avail-
able to correctional administrators provides wide scope for ex-
perimentation. With respect to the third guideline, achieving
nonexcessive differences in treatment requires only that uncon-
scionable variations between the control and experimental
groups be avoided.
The requirement of lessened severity may be more difficult
to establish. In many instances, the relative differences in severity
resulting from the new measure will be difficult to determine.
Indeed, a measure designed to be less severe may be perceived by
the experimental group as more severe. For example, the pretrial
diversion program in New York City seemingly offers an attractive
alternative to the accused. An eligible defendant may participate
in a supervised employment program rather than take his chances
with the criminal justice system. Surprisingly, many eligible de-
fendants have rejected the program. 24 The explanation for this
"0 It should be noted that this requirement would reduce the usefulness of the model
where the goal sought to be advanced is one of increased deterrence.
" A caveat must be noted here. To the extent that the scope of experimentation is
restricted by these guidelines, some accuracy may be sacrificed.
" Morris. supra note 10. at 645-56.
2 See id. at 648.
24 See Zimring. supra note 9. at 237.
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development is that even if convicted, most offenders face only
light sentences. Therefore, conviction often leads to less state
control of the individual than does the work program.25
It is, of course, impossible to design an experiment that will
cater to each offender's subjective preferences. Nevertheless, each
proposed experiment should be carefully examined to ensure that
the new measure does not involve increased severity. The sug-
gested test is an objective one well recognized by the courts: rea-
sonableness. If the experimental treatment is reasonably less se-
vere, then it will be acceptable. Such an objective standard would
minimize resistance among the subjects and encourage public
acceptance of the program.
III
DEFENDING THE OFFICIAL CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT
IN THE CONTEXT OF PENAL REFORM
A. Non-Constitutional Issues
At the outset, one must confront the objection that the con-
trolled penal experiment introduces an unacceptable element of
unfairness into the criminal justice system. This objection derives
from two characteristics of the controlled experiment: first, to
some degree such an experiment modifies the treatment of pris-
oners not according to the deserts or needs of the individual, but
rather according to the requisites of the experiment; and second,
it randomly imposes different treatment on similarly situated in-
dividuals. Under close scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent
that these two characteristics already permeate our criminal jus-
tice system.
First, the concept of general deterrence is an accepted ele-
ment of modern penal philosophy26--society imposes individual
sanctions in order to deter others from committing similar of-
fenses. In penal philosophy, as in experimental theory, a tension
exists between the ideal of individual treatment and the necessity
of uniform punishment. This aspect of general deterrence has
not gone unrecognized:
23 See id.
2 6See Andenaes. The General Preventvhe Effects of Punisment, 114 U. PA. L REv. 949,
953 (1966): "[G]eneral prevention has occupied and still occupies a central position in the
philosophy of criminal law, in penal legislation and in the sentencing policies of the courts
.... See also F. ZI RZNG & G. HAWKINs. DETERRENCE 18 (1973); Frankel. supra note 1. at
43-44.
[Vol. 62:158
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When objections are made to this definition of general
deterrence as the effect of punishment on others, it is not only
because the definition is found to be analytically misleading,
but also because it tends to engender a feeling that somebody
is being sacrificed for the purpose of instilling fear in others;
that the use of the deterrence mechanism is, therefore, in some
way unjust or improper.27
General deterrence is an accepted and, in some cases, the
overriding principle used in sentencing offenders. Judge Frankel,
for example, advocates legislative articulation of the substantive
goals to be served by imposing sentence for a particular crime. He
suggests that if the goal of general deterrence is to be achieved,
mandatory terms must be set by the legislature.28 The New Jersey
Supreme Court has also recognized that, absent a legislatively
articulated policy, a court may in its discretion sentence with gen-
eral deterrence as the primary goal. 29
The second element supporting penal experimentation is
the present lack of consistency in treating offenders-a situation
producing the very randomness sought in a controlled experi-
ment. As Judge Frankel notes: "[N]obody doubts that essentially
similar people in large numbers receive widely divergent sentences
for essentially similar or identical crimes." 30 Moreover, the system
confers almost unbridled discretionary power upon judges and
administrators. 31 Not infrequently, the treatment an offender
receives is as much a function of which judge passes sentence and
where the crime was committed, as the record and characteristics
of the individual.32 Given the wide disparities of the present sys-
2
' Andenaes. General Prevention Revisited: Research and Polio Implications. 66 1. CRIM.
L & CRIMINOLOGY 338. 343 (1975) (emphasis in original).
21 Frankel.supra note I. at 41-42.
29 In State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197. 202. 162 A.2d 851. 853 (1960), the court stated:
If the offense has strong emotional roots or is an isolated event unassociated with
a pressing public problem, there is room for greater emphasis upon the cir-
cumstnces of the individual offender. On the other hand, if the crime is a cal-
culated one and part of a widespread criminal skein, the needs of society may
dictate that the punishment more nearly fit the offense than the offender. There
the sentencing judge may conclude he should give priority to punishment as a
deterrence to others and as an aid to law enforcement.
30 Frankel. supra note 1. at 7.
31 See id. at !.
"
2 See Morris, Juvenile Offenders Before the Courts, 66 YALE LJ. 962. 967 (1957). See
also Circuit Conference of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Sentencing Institute, 27 F.R.D. 293.
383-88 (1960). where the results of a sentencing test given to a group of federal judges are
reported. In that test a hypothetical case was submitted to 27 judges. Seventeen of the judges
1976]
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tern, the introduction of a limited, randomized disparity for le-
gitimate research purposes does not appear objectionable.
The model guidelines of administrative experimentation,
!essened severity, and nonexcessive differences in treatment also
minimize the ethical problems raised by human experimentation.
First, the level of individual sacrifice is mitigated by administra-
tive supervision of the experiment. Under this guideline, each
convicted offender is initially senten:ed to a just and appropriate
term by a judge. The correctional administrator is thus given a
fixed limit within which to conduct the experiment, and the of-
fender is assured of treatment no worse than he would have re-
ceived in the absence of the experiment. The result ik that al-
though the offender may be denied the new treatment, he will not
be denied the benefit of a judicial judgment as to his appropriate
sentence.
3 3
Second, the requirement of lessened severity minimizes the
sacrifice required of any individual within the experimental
group. On the other hand, if this guideline is adhered to, a benefit
or treatment made available to the experimental group will clearly
be denied to the control group. To the extent that such variation
involves no significant difference in the severity of treatment, as
required by the third guideline, the issue of inequality will be min-
imized and, by definition, incapable of resolution until the results
of the experiment are determined. 4 However, to the extent that
obvious benefits are conferred (such as parole, release to a com-
munity facility, or transfer to a minimum security prison), the
issue of inequality will remain. The best answer to this objection is
that, if successful, the experimental program will presumably be
expanded throughout the penal system. Thus, the goals soughi
to be achieved may well justify the means.35
Third, the requirement of nonexcessive differences in treat-
ment serves several distinct goals. By limiting the variation per-
mitted in treatment, the absolute amount of inequality can be re-
duced, and sufficient deterrent effect and moral opprobrium will
be retained. Furthermore, if serious offenders are included in an
experiment, this requirement will prevent both the "release to the
suggested terms of imprisonment ranging front 6 months to 15 years. The other 10 judges
suggested probation.
" See Morris. supra note 10. at 638.
3 4 See H. ZEISEL ET AL...upra note 10. at 246.
" Se, id.
[Vol. 62:158
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streets of great numbers of dangerous criminals"36 and drastic
reductions in criminal sentences.
Thus, combining the proposed guidelines with the random-
ness required by the experimental model will produce a situation
not very different from that existing at present-with the added
benefit of a rational experimental goal. Moreover, minimizing
the ethical dilemmas involved in controlled penal experimentation
is only one consideration. Empirical knowledge is necessary for
penal reform, and the controlled experiment is clearly a viable
method of obtaining such knowledge. Whether the Constitution
permits such experimentation, however, is another question.
B. Constitutional Issues
1. Experimentation as Appropriate State Action
Controlled penal experiments have obvious constitutional
limits. These limits are particularly important at the policy for-
mulation stage and in the actual design and administration of a
particular experiment. 37 For example, enabling legislation must
limit experimentation to programs that are constitutional per se
and as applied. An experiment designed to test the utility of pro-
viding counsel to defendants accused of felonies would be clearly
impermissible, for it would necessitate denying counsel to one
group, thereby violating the sixth amendment. A constitutional
right guaranteed under all circumstances cannot be withdrawn for
purposes of experiment.38
Nevertheless, it must be determined whether controlled penal
experimentation is a legitimate state function under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. The function of social experimentation
in general has been recognized by the Supreme Court. As Justice
Brandeis wrote:
The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention,
attest the value of the process of trial and error. In large mea-
sure, these advances have been due to experimentation. In those
fields experimentation has, for two centuries, been not only
free but encouraged. Some people assert that our present plight
11 F. ZIMitING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 26, at 362.
3 tSee J. KATrZ, FXPERIMEN'TATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 2-3 (1972). Professor Katz
divides the controlled experiment into three functional parts: formulation, administration,
and review.
'See Pointer v. Texas. 380 U.S. 400. 413 (1965) (concurring opinion, Goldberg, J.):
H. ZEISE. ET AL.,supra note 10, at 242.
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is due, in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimenta-
tion in the fields of social and economic science .... There
must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to
meet changing social and economic needs.39
There is, however, a basic distinction between the social ex-
periment as Brandeis understood it and more modern concepts.
Justice Brandeis understood experimentation to encompass the
common notion of trial and error. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has often supported experimental state legislative efforts.40 But in
those instances, the entire state became the laboratory for the rest
of the country, and the new legislative program did not discrim-
inate among the state's own citizens. 41 Yet, the Court's reference to
experimentation indicates at least an acceptance of and deference
to state judgments respecting experimental legislative programs.
2. Equal Protection and the Controlled Experiment
To date, only the Second Circuit has considered the consti-
tutionality of controlled social experimentation. In Aguayo v. Rich-
ardson,42 in an opinion by Judge Friendly, the court held con-
trolled experimentation to be constitutional in the context of
welfare reform. In Aguayo, New York had imposed increased qual-
ification requirements on about twenty-five percent of the indi-
viduals eligible for welfare payments. To simplify greatly, welfare
recipients in the experimental districts were required to register
for and accept employment if offered in order to remain eligi-
ble.43 The purpose of the experiment was to develop new pro-
grams to shrink the state welfare rolls. Upholding this state action
against the equal protection attacks of welfare rights organiza-
tions, the court stated:
A purpose to determine whether and how improvements
can be made in the welfare system is as "legitimate" or "appro-
priate" as anything can be. This purpose is "suitably furthered"
"' New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (dissenting opinion,
Brandeis, J.). Accord. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. %. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1. 50 (1973);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356. 376 (1972) (concurring opinion. Powell, J.).
"E.g.. Johnson v. Louisiana. 406 U.S. 356 (1972): Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972) (both upheld nonunanimous criminal jury verdicts).
"Set Capron.supra note 17, at 156-57.
42 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
43 1d. at 1094.
[VoL 62:158
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by controlled experiment, a method long used in medical
science which has its application in the social sciences as well 44
The court further indicated that economic considerations
may be taken into account by the states. "The Equal Protection
clause," it stated, "does not place a state in a vise where its only
choices... are to do nothing or plunge into statewide action."45
Finally, the court observed that random classification is not arbi-
trary per se in a constitutional sense. The randomness at issue was
considered rationally related to the purpose of the classification-
determining whether the experimental program should be made
applicable to all state welfare programs. 46
If a fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the equal
protection clause requires the showing of both a compelling state
interest and that a "less drastic means" of furthering that inter-
est has been chosen.47 If no fundamental right or suspect class
is involved, a state need only show that the classification bears a
rational relation to a legitimate state purpose 8 and that the classi-
fication itself is reasonable and not arbitrary.49
Aguayo dealt with welfare, an important but not a fundamen-
tal interest.50 As such, the lesser standard applied, and the court
found that the test had been more than satisfied.5 1 IfAguayo stands
for the proposition that controlled welfare experimentation is
acceptable under the equal protection clause where the purpose
is legitimate and no unreasonable classification is made, then con-
trolled experimentation in the treatment of convicted offenders
may also be constitutionally acceptable.
3. The Constitutional Rights of Convicted Offenders
Whatever the case in the past, it is clear today that the con-
victed offender is afforded some of the constitutional protections
4"Id. at 1109.
4' Id. at 1109-10.
45I d.
4 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1. 17 (1973).
4"Id. at 40.
41 McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263,270 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71. 76 (1971).
5" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The Supreme Court has held,
however, that due process must be afforded the welfare claimant whose benefits are ter-
minated. Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
11473 F.2d at 1109. Judge Friendly suggested that the Supreme Court might be de-
veloping a new middle-level equal protection standard, falling in between the two tiers of
the old test. Without deciding whether such a new standard would be applicable in the
instant case, he indicated that both of the lesser standards had been met. Id.
1976]
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guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses. For
example, although at the time of sentencing a convicted offender
does not enjoy all of the procedural protections available prior to
his conviction,5 2 he does retain a legal interest in having his sen-
tence set lower than the maximum allowed by law. Hence, he is en-
titled to safeguards against sentences based upon untrue or mis-
leading information5 3 and sentences imposed for impermissible
reasons such as vindictiveness,54 wealth,55 or race. 6 A defendant's
pr'obation or parole, once granted, also give rise to an interest held
to be "valuable and ... within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment."5s Furthermore, even while imprisoned the indi-
vidual possesses certain state-created "liberty" interests, such as
"good-time" credit s8 and the expectation of consideration for pa-
role."9 As the Supreme Court has stated:
[T]hough his rights may be diminished by the needs and ex-
igencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is im-
prisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between
the Constitution and the prisons of this country.6"
Although the interests of a convicted individual in his sen-
tence and treatment have been held cognizable by the courts, these
interests are of a less than fundamental nature. The Supreme
Court has refused to give retroactive effect to its sentencing de-
" See, e.g.. Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (denied right to confront wit-
nesses at sentencing hearing): United States v. Schipani. 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff-d. 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970). cern. denied. 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (wiretap evidence ex-
cluded at trial held admissible at sentencing hearing).
" Townsend v. Burke. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
s North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
T ate v. Short. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
Many of the objections raised against capital punishment centered on the fact that
it had been imposed more frequently upon black defendants. See Furman v. Georgia. 408
U.S. 238. 250-51 (1972) (concurring opinion. Douglas. J.). But cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.
Ct. 2909 (1976): Jurek v. Texas. 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. CL 2960
0976): Woodson v. North Carolina. 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976): Roberts v. Louisiana. 96 S. Ct.
3001 (1976) (all holding death penalty not unconstitutional per se).
s- Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471. 482 (1972). Accord. Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S.
778 (1973).
s" Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S- 539 (1974).
' Bradford v. Weinstein. 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974). vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147
(1975): United States ex'rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole. 500 F.2d
925 (2d Cir.). vacated as moot sub nor. Regan v. Johnson. 419 U.S. 1015 (1974). Contra,
Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole. 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.). vacated as moot. 414 U.S.
809 (1973).
o Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539. 555-56 (1974).
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cisions in noncapital cases.61 It has deferred to legislative judg-
ments concerning differentiation of treatment among offenders
based on the interests thus served. 62 Most significantly, in non-
capital cases the Court has required only a lesser "rational basis" 63
standard---"some relevance to the purpose for which the classifica-
tion is made"64 -to sustain legislative classification of offenders
for treatment purposes. Hence, the rationale of Aguayo may be
generally applicable as long as no suspect class, such as race, is
involved.
4. Due Process and the Controlled Experiment
Two comments are necessary before presenting a due process
analysis of the experimental model. First, the requirement of ad-
ministrative experimentation removes the model from the sen-
tencing process completely. Hence, the due process requirements
inhering in the sentencing context should already be satisfied be-
fore any experiment is commenced. Second, the requirement of
lessened severity eliminates the need to examine the experimental
group's position. No individual offender is deprived of any in-
terest he had prior to the experiment merely for the purposes of
the experiment. Therefore, our inquiry must center on whether
the denial of the experimental benefit to the control group vio-
sates due process.
Whether and to what extent due process requirements at-
tach depends on two conditions. The individual must be faced
with a "grievous loss,"'6" and the interest threatened must be within
the concepts of life, liberty, or property under the fourteenth
amendment.66 To fall within these limits, the interest must be
more than a "unilateral expectancy"; it must rise to the level of an
entitlement.67 The interest may be created by the state. If so, the
interest is also defined by the state, and due process ensures that
those having the entitlement are not capriciously deprived of it.
As the Supreme Court stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, a case apply-
ing the due process clause in the corrections context:
11 E.g.. Michigan v. Pa)e. 412 U.S. 47 (1973); cf. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974)
(condition on commutation of death sentence held not subject to retroactive review).
'2 E.g., Wi!liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
"McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
64 Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422 (1974) (quoting opinion below, Mar-
shall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34. 38 (9th Cir. 1972)).
"Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471. 481 (1972).
Id.
"Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 577(1972).
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[Tihe State having created the right to good time and itself
recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for
major misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and
is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment hlio-
erty" to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate
under the circumstances and required by the Due Process
Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily
abrogated.68
Since participation in the experiment is independent of the
sentencing process and, as a state-created interest, is state defined,
it can be argued that due process requires only that all eligible
prisoners be considered for the experiment; if no member of the
control group is denied a state-created interest that he is reason-
ably entitled to receive, then this first aspect of due process will
be satisfied.69
On the other hand, the manner in which the experimental
benefit is conferred is random and, to that extent, may appear
arbitrary or capricious, suggesting a denial of due process. The
randomness, however, is rational in light of the goal to be at-
tained. Unlike the forms of arbitrariness struck down in the past,7"
purely random selection procedures can mask no impermissible
hostility to particular individuals or groups.
Nevertheless, a court might adopt a more substantive con-
stitutional analysis and attempt to judge the scientific validity of
the experiment in order to test whether the state has a valid sci-
entific purpose at all, or whether the experiment is reasonably
designed to effect the asserted purpose.71 The outcome of such a
substantive analysis would depend, of course, upon the experi-
ment in question. With respect to the state's purpose, this Note has
argued that the controlled experiment may be used to test the ef-
ficacy of different forms of penal treatment under any legitimate
- 418 U.S. 539. 557 (1974).
"See Amen v. Kennedy. 416 U.S. 134, 136 (1974) (plurality opinion. Rehnquist. J.).
Three members of the Court agreed that a statutory expectancy may include and be lim-
ited by the procedure by which the state can deny the expectancy. Id. at 152-53. See aho
Meachum v. Fano. 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2539 (1976).
7
"E.g.. North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (requiring statement of rea-
sons for increased sentence upon retrial to ensure that sentencing judge did not punish de-
fendant for appealing earlier conviction); United States ex rv. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925. 934 (2d Cir.). vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson.
419 U.S. 1015 (1974) (requiring statement of reasons for denial of parole). See aLso Capron.
supra note 17. at 162.
71 The Aguayo court rejected this approach and refused to review the experiments
methodology. 473 F.2d at 1110.
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penal policy. Therefore, as long as the state truly seeks to discover
effective methods to deter, rehabilitate, or detain offenders, it
should have no difficulty in demonstrating a legitimate interest'
and purpose. With respect to whether a given controlled experi-
ment is a reasonable means to achieve the asserted end, again,
provided the experiment is reasonable on its face and has sub-
stantial scientific validity, the state should have little difficulty in
defending the experiment against substantive attack. Moreover,
by minimizing inequalities and intrusions into prisoners' rights, the
model guidelines would do much to guarantee the reasonable-
ness of penal experiments.
5. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Controlled Experiment
One final constitutional hurdle remains: the eighth amend-
ment s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. As was sug-
gested in Furman v. Georgia72 and confirmed in Gregg v. Georgia,73
the random manner in which the death penalty had been imposed
under statutory schemes of broad and unguided discretion con-
tributed to its cruel and unusual nature. As Justice Stewart wrote:
"These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.174 It may be that
the Court will find something abhorrent about randomness in
any part of the criminal justice system, but the death penalty raises
issues qualitatively different from any others involved in the treat-
ment of offenders2. 5 Moreover, the randomness in Furman evi-
denced a complete lack of rational purpose. In the experimental
situation, randomness is both rational and purposeful. Finally,
the randomness of the death penalty masked racial and social class
overtones.78 No such possibility exists where randomness not only
describes the outcome but also the method of selection.
Another element in the eighth amendment prohibition is
the idea of proportionality. This usually involves comparing the
punishment set by the legislature with the seriousness of the
crime. 7 However, if some criminals convicted of a certain offense
are treated leniently, while others suffer the full measure of the
72 408 U.S. 238, 245-52 (1972) (concurring opinion, Douglas. J.).
73 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976) (opinion announcing the judgment of the court, per
Stewart, Powell, Stevens. J.J.).
14 408 U.S. at 309 (concurring opinion).
"See 96 S. Ct. at 2932; Moore v. Illinois. 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972) (Furman held re-
troactive).
"'See note 56 supra.
'"E.g., Weems v. United States. 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910).
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statutory punishment, a question of proportionality will arise.
Limiting the differences in treatment between the experimental
and control groups avoids this possibility.
IV
APPLYING THE MODEL
In order to make the model more concrete, three hypo-
thetical examples of its application are offered below.
A. Pretrial Diversion
Pretrial diversion programs typically attempt to divert certain
kinds of offenders, particularly first-time offenders accused of
minor crimes, from the criminal justice system. These persons are
offered employment or therapy in lieu of a criminal disposition.
Pre'.Jal diversion is perhaps unique in that its purpose is con-
stitutional, but it requires the waiver of constitutional protec-
tions. Before an individual is placed in a program, he must waive
his right to the constitutional guarantee's afforded a criminal de-
fendant. Hence, a pretrial diversion experiment requires that the
pool from which the control and experimental groups are drawn
be comprised of only those who have consented to participate.
Once consent is required, the application of the model poses
few problems. Because pretrial diversion deflects offenders from
the judicial process, any such experiment will be purely admin-
istrative in nature. Furthermore, because it is a program offered
only to nonserious offenders,7 8 the differences in treatment will
probably not be excessive. The guideline of lessened severity, how-
ever, may cause problems since the offenses committed by those
eligible for such a program carry light sentences even at their
harshest. Nevertheless, participation in an employment program
is reasonably less severe than a criminal disposition. Moreover, the
safeguard of lessened severity is in part replaced by an even
stronger protection: consent of the subjects.
B. Experimental Prisons Within One Systen
Variations in custodial programs within a prison system may
be tested by the creation of an experimental prison. Indeed, facil-
ities for such testing may soon exist in the federal system at the
"sSep Zimring. supra note 9. at 236-37.
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experimental prison at Butner." In running such a program, the
experimental and control groups are randomly selected from the
category of inmates sought to be treated, and the experimental
group is then transferred to the special facility. Such a transfer
would violate none of the prisoners' rights. Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently held that a prisr-aer may be transferred to a more
secure facility without any of the due process safeguards attach-
ing. 0 Such a transfer, however, might violate the guideline of
lessened severity. It has also been held that the mere presence
of a special program in one facility of a system does not give rise
to an equal protection violation because other facilities within
the system do not have similar programs.81
C. Early Parole
The general validity of the parole process may be tested by
the technique of controlled experimentation. This technique may
also be helpful in developing a theory of in-community treatment
for those completing their prison terms in a half-way house. In
either case, prisoners eligible for parole comprise the subject
group from which the experimentals and controls are chosen. The
experimental group is paroled automatically (in the latter case to a
half-way house). The control group, on the other hand, remains
incarcerated, at least until the individual prisoners are paroled
through normal channels. Thus, the control group is not denied
its constitutionally protected expectation of parole consideration.
The guideline of nonexcessive differences in treatment, however,
imposes some limits. For example, prison authorities could not
parole individuals serving twenty year sentences, while leaving
similar inmates to languish in prison for the entire term. The dam-
age that such a program would do to our basic notion of equality
would far outweigh the value of the particular experiment.
CONCLUSION
Although controlled experimentation is an effective and
desirable tool for furthering penal reform, it is fraught with ethical
and constitutional problems. Nevertheless, a model based upon
the three guidelines of administrative experimentation, lessened
""See Holden, Butner: Experimental U.S. Prison Holds Promise. Stirs Trepidation, 185
SCIL CE 423 (1974).
'IMeachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).
* Polakoff v. Henderson. 370 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1973). aff'd, 488 F.2d 977 (5th
Cir. 1974) (involving conjugal visitation program).
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severity, and nonexcessive differences in treatment minimizes
these problems and creates an acceptable research technique. Such
experimentation, however, is only justifiable where there is a com-
mitment to penal reform. Regardless of the model, human ex-
perimentation compromises the value of the individual and can
only be justified where there is a commitment to improving prison
conditions. Moreover, human experimentat'on in the corrections
field is susceptible to extreme abuse. The means and ends of any
experiment must be carefully scrutinized to avoid inflicting un-
necessary punishment and to ensure that no impermissible motive
lies behind the experiment. If all of the foregoing conditions are
satisfied, the controlled penal experiment may yet serve a useful
and enlightening function in our society.
Benjamin H. Green
